Against Constitutional Excess: Tocquevillian Reflections on International Investment Law by Schneiderman, David
 
585 
Against Constitutional Excess: 
Tocquevillian Reflections on International 
Investment Law 
David Schneiderman† 
Contributing to democratic malaise in operative democracies are transna-
tional constitution-like commitments, such as those found in international invest-
ment law. Among its constraints, citizens are legally discouraged from initiating 
policy innovations that will upset investment expectations. Yet, one of the great vir-
tues of democratic society, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, is the capacity of 
people to change their minds: an ability to repair mistakes. Though the threat of 
continual legislative innovation resulted in costly instability, it served as a catalyst 
for an energetic public and private life. So as to tame the threat of intemperate 
change, Tocqueville looked to the guiding hand of lawyers and judges—the func-
tional equivalent of an aristocracy—to moderate majoritarian excess. International 
investment lawyers have lost sight of the equilibrium that Tocqueville envisaged, 
privileging legal disciplines over the ability of democratic polities to experiment 
and innovate. For Tocqueville, democratic life would be intolerable and citizens 
reduced to a “herd of timid and industrious animals” if too many constraints were 
placed upon legislative energy. This Essay brings Tocqueville’s lessons to bear on 
the field of international investment law. It pleads for a reduction in the influence 
of lawyers and their legal strictures, beyond those constraints contained in nation-
al constitutional systems, on democratic practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
Political sociologist Claus Offe has diagnosed the participatory 
deficit in North Atlantic democracies as the product of an imbal-
ance in state–market relations. When the market is supreme, pub-
lic policy can do little to constrain the market’s ever-expanding 
realms. When taxing and spending are off the agenda, Offe 
claims, “democratic politics [becomes] largely a pointless activi-
ty.”1 Among the strategies for reversing democratic malaise, he 
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notes well before the election of President Donald Trump, is the 
rise of authoritarian populism premised on strengthening bor-
ders and protecting populations from the threat of foreign “oth-
ers.” Populists of this sort “are the only political agents in the 
decades since 1990 who have managed to broaden their political 
base and enhance participation.”2 
While there undoubtedly are innumerable contributing fac-
tors to democratic backsliding in operative democracies in the 
North Atlantic, principal among them is the shrinking policy 
space associated with the spread of neoliberal legality. If neolib-
eral thought has had some difficulty identifying stable bounda-
ries between states and markets,3 it also has been dedicated to 
shrinking state policy space. Driven by anxieties associated with 
rent seeking, means are sought to tame state action beyond ex-
tant constitutional constraints. Jurists have today taken up a 
question that also preoccupied Alexis de Tocqueville: What con-
straints, other than national constitutional ones, are available to 
limit majoritarian politics?4 
At the urging of legal advisors, states have turned to re-
gimes like international investment law in order to attain this 
end. This is the transnational legal order made up of over 3,330 
bilateral investment treaties, together with a number of regional 
trade and investment agreements, intended to protect foreign 
investors from adverse economic consequences. In this Essay, I 
argue that such regime efforts have contributed to the decline of 
democratic constitutionalism—paradoxically, in the name of 
constitutional values like stability, predictability, and the rule of 
law. It was to this end that the World Bank in 1997 promoted 
strategies of precommitment. The World Bank defined “arbi-
trary” government as exhibiting, among its other faults, “unpre-
dictable, ad hoc regulations and taxes.”5 The World Bank aimed 
to contain the penchant for constant legislative changes that 
sank the confidence of the owners of capital.6 Replacing defective 
national legal systems with international adjudication was the 
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proposed solution.7 The World Bank therefore recommended 
strategies from which it would be expensive to exit: 
Clearly, sovereign countries can still reverse course . . . by 
withdrawing from such agreements. But they then have to 
calculate not just the benefits and costs of the policy rever-
sal, but also the broader costs of reneging on an interna-
tional commitment for which their partners will hold them 
accountable. The threat of international censure makes 
countries less likely to reverse course.8 
Exemplary of this strategy has been the global take-up of bi-
lateral investment treaties that commit states to voluntarily 
cabin their regulatory capacity. Treaty disciplines reinforce the 
view that states have little more to do in regard to economic sub-
jects other than to get out of the way of markets. If Professor 
Mark Tushnet described the “new constitutional order” as one 
that condones extensive regulation but “chasten[s] the most ag-
gressive forms of regulation,”9 the regime I am describing ren-
ders even nonextreme forms of regulation susceptible to a claim 
for monetary damages. Citizens, as a consequence, disengage 
and consign the control of such subjects to legal elites who are 
better suited, citizens are told, to steer state policy. In this way, le-
gal elites and the institutions that they control serve constitution-
like functions by limiting the capacity of citizens and states to 
pursue their preferred policy objectives.10 They “help[ ] govern-
ments” resist “recalcitrant domestic economic and political lob-
bies” by imposing “external discipline,” Professor Thomas 
Wälde declares.11 This disempowerment of citizens in North 
Atlantic democracies contributes to the malaise that tolerates 
democratic backsliding. 
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International Economic Law: The Case of International Investment Law, in Marc 
Bungenberg, et al, eds, European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016 23 
(Springer 2016). 
 11 Thomas Wälde, Judicial and Similar Proceedings Introductory Note to Svea 
Court of Appeals: Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V., 42 Intl Legal Mat 915, 
915 (2003). 
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The analysis that follows is guided by lessons learned from 
Tocqueville’s first volume of Democracy in America.12 One of 
Tocqueville’s lessons is that among the great virtues of demo-
cratic society is the capacity to make “repairable mistakes.”13 
Another of Tocqueville’s lessons is that the guiding hand of law-
yers and judges can serve to moderate majoritarian excess.14 
Tocqueville envisaged both features as essential to democracy’s 
durability. He did not intend to bifurcate these two essential 
features of democratic society. Democracy promotion, however, 
has not been a priority for new transnational legal norms and 
institutions.15 International investment lawyers and arbitrators, 
instead, have succeeded in bifurcating Tocqueville. It is rule by 
lawyers in transnational arenas that is preferred over democrat-
ically authorized decisionmaking. This results in excessive con-
stitutional oversight, the problem at which this Essay takes aim. 
I argue that operative democracies should rejoin these two 
sides of Tocqueville and diminish the influence of investment-
law norm entrepreneurs. These advocates aim to “universalise 
their preferences” of privatization, limited states, and open bor-
ders.16 As they go about performing their drafting, interpre-
tive, and adjudicative functions—functions that they genuine-
ly believe they are best suited to perform—they aim to 
establish a different kind of equilibrium, one in which states 
are reprimanded for undermining investors’ expectations.17 So as 
to reinvigorate democratic experience and mitigate democratic 
backsliding, this Essay calls for less transnational constitutional 
oversight in economic domains and more reliance on already-
existing constitutional settlements. If we are to take seriously 
the “dangerous adventure[ ]” that is democratic existence and 
that so inspired Tocqueville,18 we must necessarily render the 
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262, 266 (Polity 2013). 
 18 Tocqueville (2004) at 280 (cited in note 12). 
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investment-law bar, indifferent to the checks and balances of 
national constitutional orders, less influential in determining 
the proper limits of state capacity.19 
This might be viewed as a difficult argument to make for a 
number of reasons. The first is the difficulty of trying to piece 
together the meandering and often contradictory argument that 
Tocqueville makes in Democracy in America.20 It is also awk-
ward to invoke, in defense of the mutability of democratic prac-
tice, an early nineteenth-century French aristocrat who de-
scribed himself as being “in the grip of a kind of religious terror” 
when confronted with American democratic life.21 A related diffi-
culty is the value that Tocqueville placed on law and lawyers, 
whose roles are elevated in investment law and whose influence 
I propose be diminished.22 What Tocqueville maintained, and 
what should not be overlooked, is the reciprocal influence of de-
mocracy on the ways of lawyers. Neither exclusively determined 
democratic outcomes.23 Even if he considered “mixed govern-
ment” (or what in England was called the “balanced constitu-
tion”) as a “chimera,” Tocqueville was in search of constitutional 
equilibrium.24 
For this reason, constitutions alone were insufficient to 
check majority tyranny.25 The US Constitution was only one 
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 22 Tocqueville’s famous quip about the inevitable legalization of politics speaks to 
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Schleifer, Tocqueville’s Democracy in America Reconsidered, in Cheryl B. Welch, ed, The 
Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville 121, 123 (Cambridge 2006). See also Pierre Manent, 
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in Tocqueville’s Thought, 27 Persp Polit Sci 79, 80 (1998) (Daniel J. Mahoney and Paul 
Seaton, trans) (discussing Tocqueville’s pairing of democracy and aristocracy); Claude 
Lefort, Writing: The Political Test 37 (Duke 2000) (David Ames Curtis, ed and trans) 
(“Tocqueville is a master in the art of contrast.”); Arthur Kaledin, Tocqueville and His 
America: A Darker Horizon 247 (Yale 2011) (“A random reading of nearly any paragraph 
or sequence . . . reveals an elaborate system of balances.”). 
 24 Tocqueville (2004) at 289 (cited in note 12). Tocqueville describes this as an “ad-
mixture of lawyer-like sobriety with the democratic principle.” Tocqueville (1946) at 203 
(cited in note 12). 
 25 See Harvey C. Mansfield, Tocqueville: A Very Short Introduction 41 (Oxford 2010). 
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element contributing to the country’s democratic makeup. The 
“success of the experiment” for Tocqueville depended on other 
elements like mores and traditions that were “not . . . designed 
by constitutional provisions.”26 So it was the conjoined effects—
the “admixture”27—of democracy and legality that rendered de-
mocracy sustainable in the long run. After all, citizens of demo-
cratic states must have the ability, Tocqueville insisted, of com-
mitting errors that can be corrected. 
Finally, it might be said that international investment law 
does not prevent democratic polities from making repairable 
mistakes; rather, states need only pay damages in order to exer-
cise that privilege. This reply not only misses the value of de-
mocracy’s “ceaseless agitation” that energizes civil society28—it 
also underestimates the gravity of a threat of a claim for dam-
ages. As the World Bank observed, the “threat of international 
censure makes countries less likely to reverse course.”29 If the 
World Bank is correct, a threat of costly damages, on top of in-
ternational censure, is more likely to dampen experimentation.30 
In spite of these risks, the argument gives rise to an oppor-
tunity to bring to bear the insights of an innovative comparative 
constitutionalist on a cognate field of law. It also offers up the 
possibility of asking investment lawyers and arbitrators to con-
sider how well their enterprise holds up to the thought of an icon 
of the liberal tradition. I surmise that it does not hold up very 
well. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. First, I discuss Tocqueville’s 
descriptive and normative account of democratic practice in 
Jacksonian America, contrasting instability in the land of equali-
ty with the role played by lawyers serving quasi-aristocratic 
functions. I turn subsequently, in Part II, to a discussion of in-
ternational investment law as a regime of neoliberal legality 
that is intended to reduce policy space, rendering policy changes 
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 29 World Development Report 1997 at 101 (cited in note 5). 
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and reversals costly. In Part III, I consider how attentive high 
courts in North America have been to constitutional excess in 
transnational legal realms. It turns out they are not so good at 
recognizing transnational legal effects on national constitutional 
space. 
I.  DEMOCRATIC ADVENTURES 
Tocqueville understood well the capacity of a democratic 
polity, despite its dangers, to maintain a sustainable equilib-
rium of societal forces.31 What Tocqueville observed in early 
nineteenth-century America was a democratic community “agi-
tated by an ill-defined excitement and by a kind of feverish im-
patience, that engender[s] a multitude of innovations, almost all 
of which are attended with expense.”32 “[W]hen public power is 
in the hands of the people . . . [t]he improving spirit bends itself 
to a thousand different purposes,” he observed.33 Those “im-
provements [ ] cannot be had for free, for the goal is to improve 
the lot of the poor man, who cannot help himself.”34 Tocqueville, 
therefore, expressed concern that this form of government was 
“costly” and “expensive.”35 Nevertheless, its “superabundant 
force” and “energy” were among the real advantages of democra-
cy.36 Its benefits spilled over into civil society, generating material 
improvement and spreading prosperity.37 Even if the majority 
could pursue its “capricious propensities in the formation of the 
laws,”38 the majority could always reflect on legislative choices 
 
 31 See Jon Elster, Political Psychology 101–02 (Cambridge 1993) (“Although 
Tocqueville points to some possible sources of instability in democratic societies, his cen-
tral assumption is very clearly that the America he had observed around 1830 was in 
stable equilibrium.”); Elster, Alexis de Tocqueville at 95–104 (cited in note 20) (discuss-
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 32 Tocqueville (1946) at 153 (cited in note 12). It was the prevalence of ever-
changing “secondary laws” that prompted Tocqueville’s observations about repairable 
mistakes. These are in contrast to the “generating principles of the laws,” by which he 
must have meant the law of the Constitution. As to the ever-changing secondary laws, 
Tocqueville mentions “three stout volumes” enacted by the state of Massachusetts legis-
lature since 1780. See Tocqueville (2004) at 286 n 2 (cited in note 12). I discuss some of 
the costly legal innovations that Tocqueville had in mind below. See text accompanying 
notes 49–57. 
 33 Tocqueville (2004) at 241 (cited in note 12). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id at 241–42. 
 36 Tocqueville (1946) at 180 (cited in note 12). 
 37 See Tocqueville (2004) at 279–80 (cited in note 12). A life accustomed to agitation 
and change is a quality “equally needed for success in commerce.” Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Journeys to England and Ireland 116 (Faber & Faber 1958) (J.P. Mayer, ed, and George 
Lawrence and K.P. Mayer, trans). 
 38 Tocqueville (1946) at 186 (cited in note 12). 
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and change its mind. This was one of the true advantages of 
democracy: the ability to repair mistakes. The “great privilege of 
the Americans is not only to be more enlightened,” wrote 
Tocqueville, “but also to enjoy the faculty of committing errors 
that can be corrected.”39 
Being a novice in US affairs, Tocqueville relied heavily on 
local informants. Among them was the young Cincinnati lawyer 
and Federalist (and later Chief Justice of the US Supreme 
Court) Salmon P. Chase, who privately expressed misgivings 
about the American experiment in mass democracy. It had the 
disadvantage of responding to redistributive demands of the 
unpropertied, Chase lamented.40 In his 1831 meeting with 
Tocqueville, Chase admitted that America had “carried democ-
racy . . . to its ultimate limits,” resulting in “very bad choices.”41 
In conversation the next day with the young Whig lawyer 
Timothy Walker,42 Tocqueville asked, “Are the laws changed of-
ten?” “Incessantly,” replied Walker, “That is one of the greatest 
disadvantages of our democracy.”43 Based on these conversa-
tions, Tocqueville, in his notebooks, described democracy in Ohio 
as being “without limits,” giving “an impression of prosperity, 
but not of stability.”44 It was this instability—this “ceaseless agi-
tation”45—that so unsettled Tocqueville. It also held out the most 
promise, he wrote in Democracy in America. This “superabun-
dant strength, an energy that never exists without it, and 
which, if circumstances are even slightly favorable, can accom-
plish miracles.”46 
 
 39 Tocqueville (2004) at 258 (cited in note 12). For differing translations of the 
French text, see Tocqueville (2000) at 216 (cited in note 12); Tocqueville (1946) at 
165 (cited in note 12). For the original, see Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie 
en Amérique 339 (Librairie Nouvelle 1874) (“le faculté de faire des fautes réparables”). 
Tocqueville appears to be following Montesquieu’s observation about the government of 
England. See Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans 
and Their Decline 88 (Hackett 1999) (David Lowenthal, trans) (“In a word, a free gov-
ernment—that is, a government constantly subject to agitation—cannot last if it is not 
capable of being corrected by its own laws.”). 
 40 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America 92 (Yale 1960) (J.P. Mayer, ed, 
and George Lawrence, trans). 
 41 Id. 
 42 For an account of Walker’s career, see generally Gordon A. Christenson, A Tale 
of Two Lawyers in Antebellum Cincinnati: Timothy Walker’s Last Conversation with 
Salmon P. Chase, 71 U Cin L Rev 457 (2003). 
 43 Tocqueville, Journey to America at 98 (cited in note 40). 
 44 Id at 262. 
 45 Tocqueville (2004) at 279 (cited in note 12). 
 46 Id at 281. See also Letter from Tocqueville to Ernest de Chabrol (9 June 1831), in 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Letters from America 68 (Yale 2010) (Frederick Brown, ed and 
trans); Tocqueville, Journey to America at 182–83 (cited in note 40). 
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In this vein, Tocqueville asked: Does Ohio “prosper because 
of democracy or despite of it?”47 The answer is provided in the 
subsequent paragraphs of his notebooks, in which he discusses 
the differences between Ohio, a free state, and Kentucky, a slave 
state situated just across the Ohio River. The economy lan-
guished in Kentucky, lacking the energy and vitality of its 
neighbor to the North. “[N]othing shows more clearly,” he con-
cluded contra Montesquieu, “that human prosperity depends 
much more on the institutions and the will of man than on the 
external circumstances that surround him.”48 
Tocqueville complained, nevertheless, that the mutability of 
laws in America “encourages democratic instability in every way 
possible.”49 “America is the one [country] in which the duration 
of laws is the shortest,”50 he declared, “allow[ing] [it] to follow its 
capricious propensities.”51 Yet it turns out that Ohio’s laws did 
not change as rapidly as Tocqueville was led to believe. Laws 
that were repealed were often replaced by substantially similar, 
though more comprehensive, legislation. Of thirty acts passed by 
the Ohio legislature in the 1820–1821 session, twenty were re-
pealed by 1834. Upon further examination, repeal of laws hav-
ing to do with such diverse subjects as divorce and alimony, in-
corporation of religious societies, and gaming and billiard tables 
were often improvements on older versions.52 To be sure, there 
were some reversals, but these turn out not to have been pre-
dominant.53 Even if Chase privately expressed concerns about 
extension of the franchise in his conversation with Tocqueville, 
in the “preliminary sketch” to his three-volume The Statutes of 
 
 47 Tocqueville, Journey to America at 263 (cited in note 40). 
 48 Id at 264. Sheldon S. Wolin observes that Tocqueville omitted to mention this 
connection—made in his notebooks—between Ohio’s nonslave status and its “radical 
democracy,” in Democracy in America. See Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville between Two 
Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life 136–37 (Princeton 2001). 
 49 Tocqueville (2004) at 286 (cited in note 12). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Tocqueville (2007) at 208 (cited in note 12). 
 52 I am grateful to Kyle Gooch, Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2009, 
for compiling these findings at my request, based on a study of Salmon P. Chase, ed, 1 
The Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory: Adopted or Enacted from 1788 to 
1833 Inclusive (Corey & Fairbank 1833). 
 53 An anonymous reviewer in the United States Democratic Review, October 1837, 
rightly complained that “[i]n points of minor importance, our laws are no doubt [ ] al-
tered, though not more frequently than those of other nations.” Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, 659, 662 (Norton 2007). James Bryce, speaking of the book as a 
whole, captured such flaws in saying that Tocqueville’s “analysis is always right so far as 
it is qualitative, sometimes wrong where it attempts to be quantitative.” James Bryce, 
Studies in History and Jurisprudence 327 (Oxford 1901). 
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Ohio, Chase characterized the “unlimited extension of the elec-
tive franchise” as having produced not “any evil” but a “safe and 
sufficient check upon injurious legislation.”54 Contributing to 
this opinion was the ban on slavery in the Northwest Ordinance, 
which ensured that the “great doctrine of equal rights” would 
generate “good government” and “wise legislation.”55 
In other words, democracy was made sustainable by placing 
public power in the hands of the people. There was further value 
to majoritarian politics. Compliance with democratic outcomes 
will be honored, Tocqueville observed, because losing political 
forces are expected to have the opportunity of securing a majori-
ty in subsequent elections: “[A]ll parties are prepared to recog-
nize the rights of the majority, because all hope some day to ex-
ercise those rights.”56 Majorities, therefore, were respected, with 
few obstacles to impede their progress—a “state of affairs,” he 
worried that is “dire and spell[s] danger for the future.”57 
If no one, in theory, is excluded from democratic practice, 
then the “tyranny of the majority” continually was a threat, par-
ticularly at the level of states.58 Democracy spelled danger un-
less mechanisms were present to check its mismanagement. 
Such mechanisms, for Tocqueville, were expected to be “func-
tional equivalents or stand-ins for aristocracy.”59 Aristocratic 
traces could be found dwelling in the lawyerly class. The “con-
servative and antidemocratic”60 element of the legal profession 
ensured that judges and lawyers could serve as “a strong opposi-
tion to the revolutionary spirit and the unthinking passions of 
democracy.”61 Few laws escaped judicial review, observed 
Tocqueville, “for there are very few laws that are not adverse to 
some person’s interest and that litigants cannot or should not 
invoke before the courts.”62 This conferred an immense power on 
 
 54 Chase, 1 The Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory at 48 (cited in 
note 52). 
 55 Id. As Frederick J. Blue notes, Chase ignored the prevalence of Black Codes in 
Ohio. See Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P. Chase, First Historian of the Old Northwest, 98 
Ohio Hist 52, 66 (1989). 
 56 Tocqueville (2004) at 285 (cited in note 12). See also Stephen Holmes, Tocqueville 
and Democracy, in David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds, The Idea of 
Democracy 23, 30 (Cambridge 1993). 
 57 Tocqueville (2004) at 285 (cited in note 12). 
 58 See Tocqueville (2004) at 175 (cited in note 12) (observing that the “business of 
the Union is infinitely better conducted than that of any of the states”). 
 59 Wolin, Tocqueville between Two Worlds at 159 (cited in note 48). 
 60 Tocqueville (2004) at 305 (cited in note 12). 
 61 Id at 303. 
 62 Id at 115. These comments anticipated A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of 
the Law of the Constitution 338 (Macmillan 3d ed 1889). 
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the judicial branch in “pointing out the faults of the legislator.”63 
“Confined within proper limits,” Tocqueville maintained, “the 
power granted to American courts to pronounce on the unconsti-
tutionality of laws still constitutes one of the most powerful bar-
riers ever erected against the tyranny of political assemblies.”64 
The legal profession offered another prophylactic to majori-
tarian excess. Although Tocqueville had occasion to speak dis-
paragingly of lawyers,65 they valued order and formalities. Their 
“spirit will be eminently conservative and anti-democratic,” as 
they will have acquired the “tastes and the habits of aristocra-
cy.”66 In a letter to his friend, Ernest de Chabrol, Tocqueville de-
scribed lawyers as forming the “resistance”—they are the “stay-
put class.”67 Yet they “serve the people’s cause”68 and so function 
as a connective tissue—a “natural liaison”69—between the aris-
tocratic and the democratic elements. Tocqueville’s paean to the 
legal profession concludes by describing how the power of law-
yers “envelops the whole of society, worms its way into each of 
the constituent classes, works on the society in secret, influences 
it constantly without its knowledge, and in the end shapes it to 
its own desires.”70 
Democratic excess was curbed institutionally by a jury sys-
tem that enabled citizens to learn about governing affairs not 
exclusively in their own interest.71 The people learn the “ideas 
 
 63 Tocqueville (2004) at 116 (cited in note 12). 
 64 Id. But see Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 156 (Hafner 1949) (Thomas 
Nugent, trans) (originally published 1748) (characterizing judicial power as “in some 
measure, next to nothing”). 
 65 See Tocqueville (2004) at 305 (cited in note 12) (noting the ease with which 
lawyers may be turned into “most useful instruments of royal authority”); Alexis de 
Tocqueville, 1 The Old Regime and the Revolution 258 (Chicago 1998) (François Furet 
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and language of the courts,” and thus “the language of the judi-
ciary becomes the vulgar tongue.”72 So much so that the “legal 
spirit, born in law schools and courtrooms, gradually spreads 
beyond their walls.”73 It eventually “infiltrates all of society, . . . 
filtering down to the lowest ranks, with the result that in the 
end all the people acquire some of the habits and tastes of the 
magistrate.”74 Juries were the “most effective means of teaching 
the people how to rule,” Tocqueville insisted.75 The jury system 
performed functions similar to individual property rights—if felt 
by all, the matter at hand could be understood by all.76 If democ-
racy did not ensure the best government, Tocqueville admitted, 
it was the best means of enabling citizens to learn from their 
mistakes. 
Political theorists, inspired by Tocqueville’s account, have 
been preoccupied with filling out the contours of contemporary 
democratic practice that were only inchoate in the early nine-
teenth century. Aside from the separation of powers, they have 
not been all that interested, however, in theorizing about law 
and the role of lawyers in curbing democratic excess.77 The phi-
losopher Claude Lefort, for instance, describes Tocqueville as 
having articulated democracy’s “prime virtue” as its “ceaseless 
agitation which . . . influences all social intercourse” and not its 
ability to provide the best government.78 Tocqueville’s work pro-
vides no “better description . . . of the democratic adventure,” de-
clares Lefort.79 In his work on democratic transitions, Professor 
Adam Przeworski similarly maintains that democracy is sus-
tainable so long as it exhibits a “ruled open-endedness, or or-
ganized uncertainty.”80 When political forces are offered the 
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opportunity to “advance their interests in the future,” present 
defeats will be tolerated.81 For this reason, we should celebrate 
uncertainty as a “conspicuous characteristic” of democratic 
practice.82 
With markets inhibiting democratic openness, there is much 
less to celebrate. Proponents of neoliberal reason exploit this 
malaise, observes Przeworski and his coauthors, even as they 
underestimate the role of democratically authorized institutions 
in facilitating public and private life.83 Because the neoliberal 
path to economic improvement necessarily produces winners and 
losers, it generates disequilibrium,84 deepening social inequality 
across regions and states.85 This “combination of an increasing 
inequality with a reduced sovereignty is likely to exacerbate so-
cial conflicts and weaken” democratic institutions86—precisely 
the point Offe makes about democratic decline in an age of aus-
terity, which introduced this Essay.87 
II.  TRANSNATIONAL BRAKES 
In this Part, I take up international investment law as a 
species of transnational legal regulation, authored by states 
and administered by a cadre of international economic lawyers, 
as an example of the limits, internalized by states, that damp-
en democratic possibilities. It is not that investment arbitration 
has shown no interest in democratic theory. In Técnicas Medioam-
bientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States (“Tecmed”),88 the 
tribunal relied on the reasoning in James v The United 
Kingdom,89 concluding, as did the European Court of Human 
Rights, that foreigners are not well represented in host-state po-
litical processes. Foreign investors are disenfranchised from 
participating in decisions that give rise to reversals in policy, 
the tribunal declared, “partly because the investors are not 
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entitle [sic] to exercise political rights reserved to the nationals 
of the State.”90 
Business firms, of course, do not have a vote, and there re-
main other means by which they can make their preferences 
known to political actors.91 Whatever passing interest tribunals 
have expressed in democratic theory mostly provides cover for 
the solicitude conferred upon foreign investors.92 This is borne 
out by Professor Gus Van Harten’s content analysis of 162 arbi-
tral awards. “[W]here elections or democracy were mentioned by 
arbitrators,” he finds, “it was often to suggest that politics had 
contributed to unsound decisions and that the arbitrators’ role 
was to ensure that investors were compensated.”93 Arbitrators, 
for the most part, appear more comfortable with disparaging 
politics so that democracy is, in Professor Sheldon Wolin’s 
words, “managed without appearing to be suppressed.”94 
This element of distrust of public authority in investment 
arbitral opinions underscores a desire to have democratic gov-
ernments get out of the way of the movement of capital. There is 
little tolerance for democratic experimentation or reversals of 
course. This is a regime that warrants to foreign investors that, 
given its capacious standards of protection, their interests will 
be vindicated in the cases in which uncertainty in state policy 
results in a significant diminution in the value of their invest-
ments. The regime sees it as being to no one’s advantage that 
democracies can reverse course, especially because reversals can 
give rise to a claim for damages. 
The manner in which investment law operates to undercut 
democratically authorized decisionmaking is exemplified by the in-
corporation of the “legitimate expectations” doctrine into “fair and 
equitable” treatment (FET). As Professor Muthucumaraswamy 
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Sornarajah notes, there was no expectation, when the “vacuous 
concept” of FET was incorporated into treaty practice, that 
states would be expected to freeze regulatory frameworks or pay 
damages for the privilege of doing so.95 It was a doctrine seldom 
recognized in the national laws of contracting states and was, 
instead, “conjured” up by arbitrators “through a mystical pro-
cess.”96 Nevertheless, F.A. Mann presciently foresaw this devel-
opment in his 1981 study of the FET clause in the British model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Admitting that, “[a]lthough 
these are very familiar terms [referring to FET], they have hard-
ly ever been judicially considered.” Mann anticipated contempo-
rary trends, opining that the language of “unfair and inequitable 
treatment is a much wider conception” than arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, and abusive treatment and “may readily include [ ] ad-
ministrative measures in the field of taxation, licenses and so 
forth.”97 
A doctrine of legitimate expectations, it was anticipated, 
could serve purposes similar to a “stabilization clause” in natural-
resource concession contracts.98 Such contractual clauses carried 
with them a commitment to investors that existing laws and 
regulations would be frozen at the time of the concession or, al-
ternatively, that the concessionaire would be exempt from ad-
verse legal changes. The bargain was that the host state could 
expect to receive negotiated royalty rates in return for legal sta-
bility over the life of an investment.99 While such commitments 
could be enforced via commercial arbitration, so-called umbrella 
clauses in BITs have had the effect of internationalizing con-
tracts so that they are enforceable before investment tribunals 
as if they were included in expressly within the terms of the in-
ternational treaty.100 
While tribunals have accepted arguments that FET man-
dates that changes of policy that upset express or implied 
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commitments attract compensation, some states have gone so 
far as to include such commitments in their BITs. For example, 
the 1998 Italy-Mozambique BIT provides that: 
Whenever, after the date when the investment has been 
made, a modification should take place in laws, regula-
tions, acts or measures of economic policies governing di-
rectly or indirectly the investment, the same treatment 
shall apply upon request of the investor that was applica-
ble to it at the moment when the investment was agreed 
upon to be carried out.101 
Professor Tarcisio Gazzini describes these commitments as “the 
treaty equivalent of the most robust form of stabilization provi-
sions, the so-called ‘freezing clauses.’”102 
Though many examples could be drawn from the arbitral 
record, the decision of the panel in the BG Group Public Limited 
Company v Argentine Republic103 case is taken up as it exempli-
fies the manner in which investment law delimits policy space.104 
BG owned a 45 percent share of a formerly public gas distribu-
tion company, having an exclusive license to deliver natural 
gas to the environs of the city of Buenos Aires.105 The licensing 
regime ensured that tariffs collected by the company would be 
recouped in US dollars, adjusted periodically, converted into pe-
sos at the time of billing, and reviewed every five years.106 The 
Argentine economic meltdown of 2000 to 2001 precipitated a va-
riety of measures for societal self-protection, including the aboli-
tion of dollarization and, due to the ensuing devaluation of the 
peso, a refusal to convert tariffs into US dollars. This was a re-
sponse, Argentina argued, “to a general crisis . . . aimed at 
maintaining the sustainability of the economy.”107 Rather than 
“facilitating . . . the unjust enrichment of certain groups and the 
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resulting poverty of others,” all participants in the economy 
were expected to share in the burden of responding to the eco-
nomic collapse.108 
BG, together with other foreign investors, were not willing 
to share in this burden and so, in April 2003, filed a dispute in-
voking a 1990 Argentina–United Kingdom Bilateral Investment 
Treaty. The company claimed that it had a “guarantee[d]” rate 
of return on its investment regardless of the financial hardships 
being experienced by Argentinians.109 Argentina “lured investors 
like BG into investing . . . by representing to them that the in-
vestment would be governed by a stable tariff regime, which 
would guarantee them a reasonable real-dollar income,” the UK 
investor claimed.110 There were no contractual commitments to 
enforce. Instead, the investor sought to hold the state to com-
mitments made via legislation and licensing. 
Having taken measures at “odds with the stability and pre-
dictability” of the legal order,111 the Argentinian government’s 
action precipitated a total collapse in the value of the invest-
ment (an estimated worth of over US $238 million).112 This, the 
company claimed, amounted to an indirect expropriation of the 
company’s assets without compensation, an “unreasonable 
measure[ ]” impairing the use of the investment that also of-
fended FET.113 I focus here on this last argument that Argentina 
failed to provide to the claimant a “stable and predictable in-
vestment environment in accordance with its legitimate and 
reasonable expectations” as part of its FET obligations.114 
The Government responded with a variety of arguments, 
among them that the regulatory framework in place at the time 
the investment was made “offer[ed] no guarantees.”115 Central to 
the Argentinian defense were arguments defending the capacity 
of states and citizens to change policy direction in order to ac-
commodate fiscal exigencies. Argentina, in other words, should 
be free to take measures for societal self-protection, and no 
public utilities license or investment treaty could be interpreted as 
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freezing that regulatory environment. This particularly is the case 
when no stabilization clause is included in the relevant BIT.116 
The tribunal declined to follow Argentina’s logic and accept-
ed BG’s claim that the company was denied FET. The company, 
after all, had invested in Argentina on the basis that the state 
would guarantee the stability of its investment interest.117 There 
has been virtual unanimity on the question of liability among 
tribunals considering claims arising out of the Argentinian eco-
nomic crisis.118 Most every tribunal, including the BG Group tri-
bunal, concluded that Argentina breached the requirement of 
FET by revamping the legal framework, thereby diminishing 
expected rates of return for investors.119 Having “entirely altered 
the legal and business environment by taking a series of radical 
measures,” Argentina entirely undermined investor expectations, 
the tribunal ruled.120 This had the effect of violating “the princi-
ples of stability and predictability inherent to the standard of fair 
and equitable treatment”—the reasonably-to-be-expected “stable 
and predictable business and legal investment environment.”121 
Argentina was ordered to pay BG over US $185 million.122 
The tribunal resisted the proposition that this finding re-
sulted in the “freezing of the legal system.”123 Instead, as the 
tribunal unsatisfyingly put it, “in order to adapt to changing 
economic, political and legal circumstances the State’s regulatory 
power still remains in place.”124 The regulatory regime generated 
“specific commitments” that the state was obliged to honor.125 
 
 116 See id *90 at ¶ 287. 
 117 See BG Group *97 at ¶ 307 (cited in note 103). 
 118 For a representative sample, see CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentine Republic, 
44 Intl Legal Mat 1205, 1231–32 at ¶¶ 239–46, 1234–36 at ¶¶ 266–81, 1237–38 at 
¶¶ 296–303 (ICSID 2005) (holding Argentina liable for breach of FET obligations); Enron 
Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/01/3, *74 at ¶ 231, *85 
at ¶ 268, *88 at ¶ 277 (May 22, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM47-9FUD (holding 
Argentina liable for the same treaty breach); Sempra Energy International v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID ARB/02/16, *78 at ¶ 268, *90 at ¶ 304, *93 at ¶ 314 (Sept 28, 2007), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/H4D6-LQMF (also holding Argentina liable for this treaty 
breach). 
 119 See José E. Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign In-
vestors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime *12 (Institute for Interna-
tional Law and Justice Working Paper 2008/5), archived at http://perma.cc/9NMY-S6L8; 
David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seek-
ing an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 Nw J Intl L & Bus 383, 387–88 (2010). 
 120 BG Group *97 at ¶ 307 (cited in note 103). 
 121 Id *97–98 at ¶¶ 307, 310. 
 122 Id *136 at ¶ 457. 
 123 Id *93–94 at ¶ 298. 
 124 BG Group *93–94 at ¶ 298 (cited in note 103). 
 125 Id *96 at ¶ 305. See also id *105 at ¶ 345. 
2018] Against Constitutional Excess 603 
Freezing and then reducing the rate of return by converting 
from US dollars to Argentinian pesos was not in keeping with 
this form of commitment through legislation and licensing. 
What policy space remained, in light of these specific commit-
ments, is never made clear. As it turns out, this was precisely 
the outcome intended by the US State Department when it 
negotiated the BIT, argues Professor José Alvarez, who was em-
ployed there at the relevant time. Despite its “penchant for de-
claring national emergencies,” as a consequence of the Argentine-
US BIT, Argentina could no longer escape liability owed to for-
eign investors in the wake of future economic crises.126 
Professor Moshe Hirsch explains that the legitimate expec-
tations doctrine under FET allows for more regulatory flexibility 
than many will admit. Regulatory changes that merely diminish 
investment value “alone are insufficient” to give rise to liabil-
ity.127 There must be, in addition, “exceptional factors,” he ex-
plains.128 Hirsch mentions only two examples that qualify as 
“exceptional”—namely, abuse of authority and continual legisla-
tive change,129 neither of which well captures the Argentinian 
case. Professors Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer similarly 
acknowledge that something more than mere regulatory change 
is needed to give rise to a violation of FET: “What matters is 
whether measures exceed normal regulatory powers and funda-
mentally modify the regulatory framework for the investment 
beyond an acceptable margin of change,” they conclude.130 What 
is determinative, then, is whether the change is abnormal or 
“exceptional.”131 The answer to this sort of question almost always 
has been determined, as in the past, by powerful capital-exporting 
states and their surrogates. Departures from their hegemonic 
version of normality will not be tolerated.132 
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III.  LOCAL MISRECOGNITION 
Recall that, for Tocqueville, lawyers and judges will be “em-
inently conservative and antidemocratic”—they are the “stay-
put class,” he believed.133 Curiously, they have, for the most part, 
paid little heed to the disequilibrium produced by the invest-
ment treaty regime. Some high courts, as a consequence, have 
failed to recognize the constitutional implications of outcomes 
like the one in BG Group. Canadian courts, for instance, show a 
marked reluctance to consider investment law as giving rise to 
any significant implications for domestic constitutional law. This 
is despite the fact that investment law’s legal disciplines “im-
pose far stricter limits on Canadian governments than anything 
in the [Canadian] Constitution.”134 
A majority of the US Supreme Court disregarded such con-
stitutional effects when undertaking judicial review of the tri-
bunal decision in BG Group PLC v Republic of Argentina.135 At 
issue before the Court were not the stabilization effects of BIT 
commitments, but review of the tribunal’s decision to accept ju-
risdiction despite the treaty’s local litigation requirement.136 As 
arbitrators have authority to determine a tribunal’s competence, 
the tribunal permitted the investor to proceed immediately to 
arbitration regardless of the Argentina-UK BIT requirement 
that the claimant first seek a remedy in local Argentinian courts 
for an eighteen-month period.137 The DC Circuit unanimously 
vacated the award.138 The Supreme Court ruled otherwise, hold-
ing that the tribunal had not exceeded its jurisdiction.139 
The investment tribunal warranted deference, wrote Justice 
Stephen Breyer for the majority, because “[i]nternational arbi-
trators are likely more familiar than are judges with the expec-
tations of foreign investors and recipient nations regarding the 
operation of the [local remedy] provision.”140 In so doing, the 
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majority likened investment arbitration to private commercial 
arbitration.141 The Court’s solicitude toward commercial arbitra-
tion is informed, in turn, by its deference toward labor arbitra-
tion outcomes. Only “deviat[ing] wildly from the contract” or the 
absence of any “contract to arbitrate in the first place” warrant 
judicial interference in labor disputes, the Court has held.142 Be-
cause labor arbitration is the “paradigm of private justice”143—“a 
system of private law,” according to the Court—significant def-
erence is appropriate.144 The unusual influence of labor arbitra-
tion on BG Group is made plain in Breyer’s subsequent book on 
the role of global and comparative legal developments on the 
Court’s work. Breyer compares the Court’s approach to invest-
ment arbitration to the review of labor arbitration awards under 
US law.145 How labor arbitration can be likened to this conten-
tious subfield of public international law is never well explained. 
Equating judicial review of labor disputes with determina-
tions of state regulatory capacity in a wide array of policy fields 
looks like a category mistake.146 Chief Justice John Roberts, in 
dissent with Justice Anthony Kennedy, took a different view: 
the BIT’s local litigation requirement was a condition precedent 
to an agreement to submit a claim to arbitration. There could be 
no jurisdiction—no acceptance of the unilateral offer to consent 
to arbitration—until this condition was satisfied.147 Roberts had 
a better sense of the stakes involved. “It is no trifling matter,” 
he declared, “for a sovereign nation to subject itself to suit by 
private parties; we do not presume that any country—including 
our own—takes that step lightly.”148 
That the stakes are quite high is revealed by the fact that 
former President Barack Obama, together with the US Trade 
Representative (USTR), trumpeted parallels between investment 
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treaty protections and rights available to citizens under the US 
Constitution when seeking congressional authorization to com-
plete the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (from which the 
United States has now withdrawn). Given the breadth of in-
vestment treaty protections, they turn out even to exceed safe-
guards available to US citizens in the Bill of Rights.149 The ma-
jority of the Court seemed curiously disinterested in such 
linkages. As Tocqueville reminds us, “when free to choose, 
[lawyers] will not innovate.”150 If they can avoid it, they will not 
want to be seen to be impeding the smooth movement of global 
capital. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems that Tocqueville’s lesson—that democracy’s great 
advantage is the ability to make repairable mistakes—has large-
ly been lost on lawyers working within the subfield of interna-
tional investment law. To be sure, there are tendencies operat-
ing in the other direction that are intended to restore 
(“recalibrate” is the preferred term) some sort of equilibrium to 
the system.151 Such efforts, however, mostly are modest and, even 
then, resisted by many investment lawyers and arbitrators.152 Na-
tional court judges, at times, rise to the occasion and resist un-
reasonable encroachments on policy space beyond that availa-
ble in national constitutional orders.153 They are not 
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consistently reliable in this regard, however, as the North 
American record suggests. 
This bifurcation of Tocqueville by the legal profession 
gives rise to concerns addressed at the end of the second vol-
ume of Democracy in America and taken up again in The Old 
Regime and the Revolution. At the conclusion of his first work, 
Tocqueville worried about a new kind of despotism that could 
befall democratic societies. It would isolate individuals, reducing 
them to children, he wrote. “Rather than tyrannize,” such a form 
of despotism “inhibits, represses, saps, stifles, and stultifies, and 
in the end [ ] reduces each nation to nothing but a flock of timid 
and industrious animals, with the government as its shepherd.”154 
In a famous passage in The Old Regime and the Revolution, 
Tocqueville expanded on this dystopian vision. It was the very 
essence of despotism, he declared, to spread the “love of profit” 
and “material pleasure and comfort” above all else.155 He casti-
gated “private interests, too given to looking out for themselves 
alone.”156 Tocqueville considered eighteenth-century physiocrats 
(and socialists157) as exhibiting a penchant for seizing “social 
power” away from the people in order to “shape” the nation “in a 
certain way.”158 For them, “it was for the state to form the citi-
zen’s mind according to a particular model set out in advance.”159 
The state’s “duty was to fill the citizen’s head with certain ideas 
and to furnish his heart with certain feelings that it judged nec-
essary.”160 This, for Tocqueville, amounted to “democratic des-
potism”: “Above society, a single official, charged with doing 
everything in its name, without consulting it.”161 Have invest-
ment lawyers been leading citizens of democratic states in 
these directions? 
Neoliberal legality, I have argued, has helped to precipitate 
a slide into democratic passivity. Excessive constitutional rights 
conferred upon powerful economic actors and policed by transna-
tional legal institutions exacerbate these tendencies, rendering 
democratic politics a less meaningful means for expressing politi-
cal preferences. International investment law, more particularly, 
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serves to constrain democratic capacity in operative democra-
cies by conferring privileged access to foreign investors togeth-
er with legal rights encapsulating the highest standards of pro-
tection known to international law. As Professor Jeremy 
Waldron observes, “no such certainty is available in any other 
realm of economic activity.”162 Citizens are reduced to debtors 
jointly liable for the behavior of their states, and politics is emp-
tied of the long-standing tension between democracy and mar-
kets.163 If determining the proper sphere of government inter-
vention in economic subjects has long been the work of 
democratic deliberation, such matters are unlikely to be perma-
nently resolved by the investment-law regime. The tumult of 
democratic life, which so inspired Tocqueville, ensures that, de-
spite the regime’s constitutional aspirations, it will be, if not 
short lived, the subject of continued political contestation. 
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